Repatriation, Resettlement, Integration: A study of the three refugee solutions

THE NIAPELE PROJECT

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For The Niapele Project

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Foreword by The Niapele Project – October 2008

Since the spring of 2007, The Niapele Project has engaged with the Liberian refugees in Ghana, to find sustainable solutions to the issues facing vulnerable refugee children. Having been present in the field for 15 months, we have witnessed the way in which protracted refugee situations are handled. Beyond the rhetoric, the policies, and the legal framework, we have found that refugees themselves often feel marginalized from the process of defining their own fate, feeling powerless to control their destiny. For us, this has meant that beyond our role in developing sustainable strategies to improve the livelihoods of vulnerable refugee children, our partners and friends in the field have often turned to us for advice and guidance, and we have often found ourselves in a position where we had to mediate between the refugees, the UNHCR, and the Ghanaian authorities. We have come to recognize our work as agents of positive change to extend far beyond direct services to grassroots organizations, their leaders and their beneficiaries – recognizing that our social work does not exist in a vacuum. The Niapele Project has been attempting to forge relationships and partnerships that would enable us to assist in these complex protracted refugee situations.

It is against this backdrop that in the spring of 2008, Penelope Chester, founding member of The Niapele Project, turned to a group of graduate students at Sciences Po (Paris), to have them study the various approaches to solving protracted refugee situations. This knowledge helps The Niapele Project to fully understand the relevant policy and legal framework, and, consequently, enable the organization to be a more informed, and more effective advocate for displaced populations.

This study seeks to clarify the relevance of, and the relationship between, the three policy options available in attempting to resolve protracted refugee situations: local integration, resettlement, and repatriation. Having this knowledge allows us to compare the rhetoric and its application in the real world, and helps us to better identify shortcomings, and determine how we can best direct our efforts to improve the way in which these situations are resolved.

We hope that other field practitioners, advocacy organizations, and students of international relations, human rights, and development will find this study useful – we welcome your comments and feedback.

For more information, please visit: www.theniapeleproject.org
ABSTRACT

Three options are available to residents of a refugee camp at the time of its closure: Resettlement to a third country, Repatriation to their home country and Integration into the host country. Yet, for many in a Protracted Refugee Situation (PRS), the options are not necessarily as clear-cut. Living in a camp for more than 10 years, these refugees often develop semi-attached lives between the memory of their home country and their daily existence in their host country. The international community, under the guidance of the UNHCR, has seemingly chosen voluntary repatriation as the most politically viable and durable option, but its timing and applicability remain in question. Integration is rarely a welcome option in the eyes of the host country, for reasons of political and economic friction. Resettlement, equally, is rarely explored, as it is not often seen as a ‘solution’ but rather as another displacement, and difficult to implement, given the high degree of policy and logistical coordination between host countries and the UNHCR, who facilitates the process. Because every protracted refugee situation displays unique features and dynamics, this study seeks to clarify the effectiveness of, and the interplay between the three solutions, and the conditions under which they are applied, as well as whether their application is fair towards the refugees.

INTRODUCTION

Defined on January 1, 1951 by the Convention relating to the status of refugees, a refugee is a person who,

“...Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”

Thus, the condition of refugee is a temporary situation in which international protection is granted in order to fulfill a gap left by national authorities in the protection of certain individuals. When dealing with refugee crises, three solutions are envisaged: repatriation, local integration, or resettlement in a


third country. In reality, these solutions are difficult to apply, as refugee crises are often prolonged and the refugees spend a considerable amount of time in exile. This is then called a ‘protracted refugee situation’: as of 2006, there were at least 33 "protracted refugee situations" involving groups of 25,000 people or more who have been in exile for over five years. According to UNHCR data, in 2006, altogether they accounted for 5.7 million of the world's 9.2 million refugees. While these situations are not tenable, the solutions are not obvious. For example, in cases where refugees remain in a host country for over 30 years, like Burundians in Tanzania, issues of identity, as well as land and property rights in the country of origin aggravate the existing problems in the search for a solution. Protracted Refugee Situations are particularly unique in that refugee relations to host country and home country evolve as years go by, as new generations are born in the host country. This study will examine examples of protracted refugee situations and the degrees of success surrounding each of the three ‘solutions’, while taking a particularly critical look at the idea of ‘voluntary’ repatriation: its timing, its application, and its management in consideration of the state of mind of the refugees themselves.

LOCAL INTEGRATION

Local integration is the process in which refugees settle permanently in the host country. However, for a series of political and practical reasons, local integration is not a common solution. In fact, some countries even discourage this practice, conceding to refugees nothing but temporary and

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4 The so called "1972 caseload" which differs from the group of refugees that arrived in the 1990s.


restricted asylum conditions and discouraging their self-reliance in order to have them leave the host country as soon as possible, even if their origin country is not safe, thus promoting early repatriations.

**Aspects of local integration**

In order to achieve a durable solution to refugee crises, the process of local integration should involve three inter-related aspects: legal concessions, economic progress, and social and cultural adjustment.

First, the host country will have to make a series of legal compromises granting refugees basic rights and a status that is progressively closer to that which the State assures its citizens. The most important aspects are: access to chief public services such as health care and education, right of entry to the labor market, and the capacity to acquire and sell possessions. In the long run this process should allow the refugee to have a permanent residency status, and sometimes, even the State’s citizenship.

Furthermore, the host country should stimulate self-reliance of the refugees during the integration process. This should include measures like promoting integration in the local labor market, facilitating land access in rural areas, recognizing equivalence of academic or professional diplomas, and the concession of legal rights (such as right to property and other economic and social rights) that enable refugees to provide for themselves without outside assistance. As refugees become less dependent on

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8 Whether or not the country of origin is deemed “safe” is not based upon the refugee’s perception of the security situation, but on whether or not government authority has been restored and conditions that warranted the refugee status “no longer exist.” This is problematic, as the refugees’ perception of the security situation is often dramatically at odds with that of authorities, both at home and in the host country.

9 “The Executive Committee, (...) (K) Acknowledges that the process of local integration is complex and gradual, comprising three distinct but inter-related legal, economic, and social and cultural dimensions, all of which are important for refugees’ ability to integrate successfully as fully included members of society; and notes that refugees’ understanding of these dimensions may need to be facilitated through proper counseling and advice; » UNHCR, *Conclusions on Local Integration*, Executive Committee, N. 104 (LVI) - 2005. Available online at: http://www.unhcr.org/excom/EXCOM/4357a91b2.html last access on June 7th, 2008.

10 Ibid, item (L).
government and humanitarian aid, they should be able to develop a sustainable way of life, contributing to the host country’s economy\textsuperscript{11}.

The latter aspect, which is also the most complicated one, involves a social and cultural integration process. This requires from the refugee an ability to adapt to the local community, but at the same time demands that the community is ready to embrace these refugees without any discrimination or exploitation towards them\textsuperscript{12}. The process should not result in an acculturation of the refugee group but rather in an environment of tolerance, non-discrimination, and diversity\textsuperscript{13}.

For these reasons, local integration is only achievable if there is a favorable atmosphere in the host country that allows the development of such a process. A preparation of the refugees is also necessary. Their understanding of this process and of the mechanisms of local integration, as well as their awareness of their rights and responsibilities in this process, is essential to avoid loss of their cultural identity and still be able to integrate into the host community\textsuperscript{14}.

\textbf{Obstacles to local integration}

A great obstacle to local integration as a solution for refugee crises is the lack of political will of many host states. Indeed, many countries consider refugees a « burden », and not capable of any meaningful social and economic contribution. Moreover, they are seen as a threat to national security.

The first obstacle, the perception of refugees as a temporary inconvenience to the host country because they rely heavily on government and international assistance, creates the sentiment that if locally integrated refugees are not able to sustain themselves without the outside assistance that was available in the camps, , they will consequently become a permanent burden to the host country\textsuperscript{15}.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid, item (M)

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, item (N)


However, such a statement finds no empirical evidence, as we can see in Uganda and Zambia’s example of local integration programs. Even though none of these strategies provide a real legal framework for local integration, nor offer their proper nationality to the refugees, they still provide tools for refugees’ economic sustainability and interaction with the host community. Both countries provide land for refugees where they can produce food for themselves and allow them to sell in the local markets, thus achieving self-reliance\(^\text{16}\). In fact, refugees tend to seize opportunities to achieve self-sustainability, becoming independent of outside assistance even when there is no formal program of local integration.

For instance, self-settled refugees in Uganda who are not part of any local integration program of the government, refuse the assistance given inside camps in order to engage in local economies. The refugees are capable of sustaining themselves and are seen as a benefit to the local community, contributing to its economic progress\(^\text{17}\). A similar situation occurred in the Liberian refugee camp of Buduburam in Ghana. The assistance to these refugees had been reducing since 1997, and in 2000, the UNHCR withdrew its assistance, hoping that this would encourage the process of repatriation. Nevertheless, these refugees remained in Ghana and managed to live without humanitarian assistance\(^\text{18}\).

These examples show that economically integrated refugees cannot only be self-reliant but furthermore are most likely to contribute to the development of the host country if the opportunity to integrate exists\(^\text{19}\). Nevertheless, certain host countries place refugees in a much inferior position concerning their legal rights, than that assured to their nationals, thus prohibiting their freedom of movement, the buying and selling of certain possessions and, in some cases, even denying access to the


local labor market\textsuperscript{20}. In situations like this, it is almost impossible for the refugee to reestablish and have a sustainable life in the host country. As a result, they become marginalized in the host community/society.

Another argument that host governments use against local integration is national security. Refugees are often construed as a threat to the host country’s security - there is a suspicion that they will bring crime and violence into their country of refuge. There is also a fear that in engaging in the process of local integration, the State might lose control of the movement of people under their jurisdiction, including some armed elements along with refugees. The latter situation, which has plagued the stability of refugee and IDP camps in the Eastern DRC\textsuperscript{21}, generally holds true in situations where ex combatants and former child soldiers are thought to have “infiltrated” a given group of refugees\textsuperscript{22}. In other situations, like for Burmese refugees in Northern Thailand, a tense political climate can also contribute to the isolation of refugees.

This has been the common attitude in Uganda towards refugees since the country’s independence\textsuperscript{23}. The following statement from an immigration official in western Uganda expresses well this perspective: « Refugees are not actually supposed to integrate freely into the local community. They are supposed to be in confined spaces and handed over to UNHCR (... ) the existing few jobs would be taken by refugees, thuggery would increase. Lawlessness would come in.\textsuperscript{24} »

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\textsuperscript{21} According to a 1997 UN report, “The complexity of the problems was due to the suddenness and massive scale of the influx of refugees as well as its composition. The people who fled Rwanda were a mixture of refugees that included former politicians, soldiers and militiamen who had taken an active part in planning, organising and carrying out the genocide in Rwanda.” Refugee Camp Security in the Great Lakes Region, UN Inspection and Evaluation Service, April 1997 - http://www.unhcr.org/publ/RESEARCH/3ae6bcfd0.pdf


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Concerns with national security were also expressed by the Ghanaian Prime Minister in response to the protest in Buduburam at the beginning of 2008. He considered that national security was a supreme value, and that Liberian protests were a threat to this value. The local press also played an important role in spreading the idea of a « threat to national security ». The Ghanaian press portrayed Liberians as importing from their country of origin violence and criminality into Ghana. At a press conference in April 2008, the Ghanaian Minister of Interior, Kwamena Bartels, stated: “Government is aware of the presence of a number of Ex-combatants at the settlement and will not sit down unconcerned for our national security to be jeopardized.” He further expressed the unwillingness of the government in supporting the local integration of these refugees. In this sense, public opinion can be a powerful instrument in creating obstacles that hinder the process of local integration.

These types of considerations regarding refugees and national security create rumor and suspicion that surrounds refugees and most often increase the environment of animosity between the refugee group and the local community, as in the Liberian case. These remarks on national security can also play a role in the creation of legislation with discriminatory content, such as the ultimatum given to several refugee groups in Kenya, or the Tanzanian Refugees Act of 1998.

Confronting these issues, refugees feel, in most cases, unwelcome in the host countries. This feeling of not belonging that the refugee might face in the new community of the host country will work against the integration process. In the already cited case of Liberian refugees in Ghana, the refugees refused local integration as a possibility; focusing on resettlement or repatriation, mostly because they

26 Ibid.
had no sense of belonging to the community, (they had no access to Ghanaian schools or the labor market)\(^{31}\).

Besides that, there is discrimination against the refugees who are considered dangerous and, at other times, seen as taking away jobs or surcharging a public infrastructure\(^ {32}\). This lack of belonging to the host country and the fear of discrimination\(^ {33}\) are great obstacles in the way of local integration for refugees who often prefer to return to their home country as soon as they deem it safe, or live with the hope of being resettled in a third country.

**When is local integration appropriate?**

As demonstrated above, local integration demands a series of conditions in the host country that will allow the refugee to assimilate fully. In order for local integration to take place, it is fundamental to have the participation and willingness of the host government. Preliminary conditions that need to exist before local integration can take place include involvement and cooperation of the host government, adequate foreign aid, receptiveness of the host population, an economic context that allows for the refugees to be self-reliant, and finally, the complete legal integration of the refugees into the society.

Local integration is most likely to be a successful and durable solution for refugees when they share a language, culture or an ethnic origin with the host community. This is, for example, the case of a group of Burundians being integrated in the Tanzanian region of Kigoura, a region with which they share strong linguistic and cultural similarities, thus easing the process\(^ {34}\).

In the same way, when refugees present specific skills that are needed, or move to areas where land is available, or if they attract investments and resources, their integration is more likely to be a


\(^{33}\) « My movement is limited because some Ugandans view refugees badly » Ibid, p. 605, « As recent public meetings have shown, most Liberians strongly oppose local integration. We fear that once UNHCR leaves, we will lose our strongest advocate and our position in Ghana will become much worse. » excerpt of the Liberian refugee women communication, Liberian Refugee Women with Refugee Concerns, Buduburam Refugee Camp, February 8, 2008. Available online at: http://www.equalitytrumpet.org/refugee_women_protest.html last access June 7th, 2008.

smooth process. Informal, « de facto » integration occurred in the case of self-settled refugees in Uganda, who received support from local communities in the beginning of their activities and are now recognized for their contribution to the community’s economic development\(^\text{35}\). This is also the case of Angolan self-settled refugees in Zambia\(^\text{36}\).

It is also crucial to consider refugee perspectives and opinions before pursuing a process of integration into the host country. Some hope to return home as soon as possible (particularly for cultural reasons), and will not establish themselves in the host country permanently. The same will happen with refugees who harbor the hope to be resettled in a third country.

Besides, not all refugees who are locally integrated want to be naturalized and live as citizens of the host country; some may desire to return home as soon as they have the opportunity to do so. These refugees will profit from local integration to a certain extent, but do not have the intention to establish in the host country\(^\text{37}\).

On the other hand, there are refugees that will not return home, or feel unable to do so for several reasons. In this case, if given the appropriate conditions, they will probably settle in the host country.

Particularly in protracted refugee situations, local integration seems to be a viable alternative, due to difficulties in recovering properties or land in their country of origin, and may be already integrated in the host country’s economy. In these situations, it is also important to consider an approach based on identity issues, that is, an analysis of a possible bond to that community. This identity bond with the host country is most likely to exist for refugees that have been living in exile for an extensive period, or even were born in the host country.


\(^{37}\) "One of the arguments against local integration is that it will ultimately discourage refugees from returning home. This is based on an assumption that, somehow, all refugees are motivated by the desire to become naturalized. (...)No doubt there are also a number of ‘refugees' who no longer identify themselves as such and who have become, effectively if not legally, naturalized." , Ibid, pp. 614-615.
Finally, local integration is best used in conjunction with voluntary repatriation and resettlement policies. Because, as stated above, local integration is a complex process which requires a significant degree of political commitment, a propitious environment, and a strategic policy framework allowing for genuine integration, it is often adopted once the refugee case load as diminished. In Ghana and in Liberia, in 2008, policies promoting and facilitating repatriation have resulted in the decrease of the overall number of refugees residing in those countries. In Ghana, the Government has announced that the Buduburam refugee settlement would revert to Ghana. This will have followed the repatriation of an expected 18,000 individuals through the UNHCR, leaving a residual caseload of about 5,000, taking into account the large amount of refugees returning to Liberia by their own means. Given the smaller population size, the Government of Ghana intends to disperse the remaining refugees around the country, in an effort to integrate them into local communities.

While this approach has its merits, it does raise the question of whether severing the vital community ties for Liberians in Ghana will be detrimental to their integration. Indeed, for almost two decades now, Liberians in Ghana have developed a strong sense of community, and their ability to surmount difficult times was strengthened by the advantages of belonging to a community they could rely on. Similarly, in Liberia, at the official close of the voluntary repatriation exercise for Sierra Leonean refugees in June 2004, some 3,500 refugees were verified, constituting the residual Sierra Leonean caseload. Given the relatively small number of refugees who opted not to repatriate, the UNHCR, in conjunction with the Liberian Government, is considering the application of local integration for all residual refugees as the only available durable solution option.

A policy promoting local integration is thus most likely to succeed when the refugee caseload is low, and when the refugees remaining behind have opted for this solution. This process can only succeed if refugees can enjoy the same rights as citizens, and do not face discrimination – the empirical evidence for the cases of Liberians in Ghana and Sierra Leoneans in Liberia, once it is available, should be useful in understanding what strategic and policy steps must be taken in order to ensure this sensitive process succeeds.

39 Report by Henry Snyder, The Niapele Project program manager, Monrovia, Liberia – October 22nd 2008 (for a copy of the report, please contact The Niapele Project)
RESETTLEMENT TO A THIRD COUNTRY

In instances where neither integration nor voluntary repatriation is possible, resettlement to a third country is the third solution recommended by the UNHCR to resolve refugee crises. Local integration and resettlement are applied when circumstances having caused the initial flight are still affecting the country of origin, and seem insoluble in the short or medium term.

What is Resettlement?

When resettlement occurs, refugees are transferred from the country in which they found refuge to another country which agrees to welcome them. The UNHCR generally gives priority to individuals with a high protection need, as well as women and highly vulnerable families. In some cases the UNHCR, in collaboration with relevant countries, can also resettle groups or specific categories of refugees. This kind of resettlement is generally recommended for populations that are victims of protracted situations, and when neither repatriation nor local integration seems possible.

Resettlement was used for the first time by the UNHCR in 1956 when some 200,000 Hungarians found refuge in European countries. In the 1970s, it was also the preferred solution for the majority of approximately two million refugees in Thailand from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the majority of them being resettled in the United States.

The UNHCR proceeds to resettlement based on the willingness of host countries. The main countries which regularly participate in resettlement programs are Australia, Canada, Denmark, the United States, New Zealand and Sweden. Within the European Union, Sweden and Denmark lead the way in resettlement programs.

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40 Cfr http://www.cerium.ca/La-reinstallation-des-refugies
http://www.unhcr.fr/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/protect?id=45be06712


Dynamics of resettlement

Even if many countries agree to receive refugees temporarily when a crisis occurs, fewer than 20 countries actively participate in resettlement programs in collaboration with the UNHCR by admitting every year a pre-defined number of refugees.

Globally, the number of persons benefiting from resettlement dropped sharply after the September 11th attacks, particularly in the United States. It then rose again, to reach approximately 84 700 in 2004, a 50 % increase with regard to the previous year. This resumption was particularly noticeable for the main resettlement countries: the United States and Australia (Appendix I).

In 2006, a total of 71,700 refugees were admitted for resettlement in 14 countries, of which 41,300 are in the United States; 13,400 in Australia; 10,700 in Canada; 2,400 in Sweden; 1,000 in Norway, and 700 in New Zealand.

Issues and Challenges of Third Country Resettlement

Resettlement is both a durable solution and a fundamental tool of protection. It is sometimes the only way to effectively guarantee the physical and legal protection of refugees. By agreeing to resettle refugees, host countries also accept to share the burden of asylum. Shunned by the international community in the past, resettlement as a durable solution has recently benefited from renewed interest.43

At any rate, resettlement remains an exceptional and complex solution, which only a small percentage of refugees benefit from. The numbers speak for themselves: with 71,700 refugees resettled in 14 host countries in 2006 - of approximately 11.4 million registered refugees worldwide44 - less than 1 % of refugees benefit from resettlement every year. It is clear that the need for protection largely exceeds the number of available places for resettlement.

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43 http://www.aidh.org/Refug/chiffres-2005.htm#8

44 According to UNHCR data, there were a total of 67 million displaced people around the world – only 11.4 million of those fell under the mandate of the UNHCR. 2007 Global Trends (published June 2008) http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4852366f2.pdf
Given its limited reach, partners (and especially the UNHCR) are increasingly placing an emphasis on the "strategic use"\(^\text{45}\) of resettlement. The strategic application of this policy can have positive consequences on the broader, overall process of dealing with a particular protracted refugee situation. Indeed, some believe that resettlement of a number of refugees from a specific group would theoretically simplify voluntary repatriation and local integration, as it would free up host countries and countries of origin from a considerable burden. That said, the hopes stirred up by the possibility of resettlement often complicate UNHCR activities, and prevent the implementation of the two other solutions.

The effective implementation of resettlement to a third country presents a number of challenges. First of all, successful resettlement depends on the capacity of resettled refugees to integrate in the host country. Resettled refugees must be able to adapt themselves to the life, culture and socioeconomic structures of the host country (they must, for example, take care of themselves after a certain adjustment period, which implies an ability to take on a wage earning activity). This also suggests that a minimum level of education is necessary (we can easily imagine the challenges faced by an illiterate resettled refugee in a host country, who has to learn the language to be able to integrate the labor market).

In addition, vulnerability\(^\text{46}\) is not the priority in the American, Canadian and Australian resettlement programs – selection criteria are based on an individual refugee’s ability to integrate into the host country. The prospect of resettlement sometimes incites refugees to renounce voluntary repatriation, leaving them hoping for resettlement, as they have seen dozens or hundreds of their peers be extended what they construe as a privilege. This hope can occasionally be a source of considerable tension between refugees and the staff of the UNHCR. Frustrated by long delays or the refusal of their application, refugees sometimes resort to violence against the UNHCR staff and its partners, by protesting in front of UNHCR offices, or blocking the access to offices in order to force authorities to resettle them, as in the case of refugees from Sierra Leone in Conakry\(^\text{47}\). These acts of violence prevent refugees with a real need of protection from gaining access to these offices. Resettlement can also lead


\(^{46}\) In an attempt to prioritize the needs of refugees, the UNHCR and its partners use the criteria of vulnerability. Vulnerable refugees who most often fall under this criteria are orphans, young mothers, widows, and the elderly.

\(^{47}\) http://www.cerium.ca/La-reinstallation-des-refugies
to tensions within refugee communities. It is common for refugees that opted for local integration or repatriation to claim to have done so because they were considered as an obstacle to the resettlement of the group to which they belonged. It often happened that certain refugees who had opted for local integration or voluntary repatriation moreover claimed to have received threats because they were considered as an obstacle.

For all the reasons listed above, resettlement can be logistically difficult, on a local and international level. It is often used to supplement frequent means of integration or repatriation, the latter of which is the most commonly used solution.

REPATRIATION

Increasingly established as the most viable solution for refugees, repatriation is the most frequently employed solution to a forced migration situation, primarily for reasons of durability: returning, if possible, to the pre-conflict status quo. Of the 11.4 million cross-border refugees under the protection of the UNHCR in 2007, the goal for the vast majority of these situations will be repatriation to home countries. Increasingly, repatriation is used as a tool for the stabilization of a post-conflict country. Beyond reasons of political stability, according to some, the reintroduction of previously displaced populations « enhances family units and national identity of returning refugees. » To what extent, however, is the repatriation of displaced persons the « best » solution to a prolonged refugee situation?

While there are many practical considerations that would discourage any of the first two solutions, the sense of ‘place’ is a driving reason for many refugees to return home: regardless of the actual conditions in countries of origin, the homeland, and the mental image thereof becomes a driving force in the minds of the refugees. Place or «sense of place» as defined by the anthropologists Feld and Basso, is the emotional feeling of connection to a geographical location. Refugees, by definition, are living with a


49. Chande, 122.

depleted sense of place, unable to establish their existence in their new surroundings without either fully integrating or returning to the homeland. As much as refugees may develop real relationships with their temporary living situations, defined often as *emplacement*[^51], the interweaving of place, identity and practice as to generate a situation between person and place, this incorporation of landscape into daily practice is a survival tactic and, for most, homeland remains the realm to which they remain inextricably linked.

Within the domain of international human rights law, repatriation is consistently promoted by international human rights organizations, and is transitioning from a ‘customary law’ to a hard law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights cites, « Everyone has the right to leave any country, and to return to his country. »[^52] While repatriation is generally defined, voluntary repatriation is not established as clearly in the annals of the UN; merely provisions attempting to prevent the *refoulement*[^53] of refugees, defined in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention with regards to the Status Refugee as the state’s expulsion of a refugee “in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where he or she would be exposed to persecution.”[^54] Furthermore, the prohibition of refoulement relies heavily on the *subjective* feelings of the refugee, defined in Article I of this Convention as the implication that fear should have ceased, the « well-founded fear of persecution. » One can draw from this the two principles that guide parameters for repatriation: the refugee populations should neither fear persecution, nor be *refoulés* where they may suffer harm. Yet, when refugee status is revoked, it is this later consideration, the ‘objective’ security conditions of the home country that ultimately prevail. While there is no concrete international law norm for the voluntariness of repatriation, we must then examine more closely the current standard operating procedures that are in place with regard to voluntary repatriation.


[^52]: UDHR, Article 13, Paragraph 2

[^53]: *Article 33. Prohibition of expulsion or return ("refoulement")* “No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”

The Voluntariness of Repatriation

Repatriation is not an option if it is not voluntary. Forced repatriation is merely another forced migration, albeit to the land of origin. « Forced repatriation is tantamount to expulsion, which is expressly forbidden by the Refugee Convention and international custom. » The UN High Commission on Refugees states,

No refugees or displaced persons who have finally and definitely, in complete freedom, and after receiving full knowledge of the facts, including adequate information from the governments of their countries of origin, expressed valid objections... shall be compelled to return to their country of origin.«

At the point at which a group of refugees no longer becomes tenable in their host environment, how then, to encourage re-entry into their host countries? While voluntary repatriation is generally considered the most satisfactory and durable solution, it is ultimately the solution over which the UNHCR, individual states, and the international community have the least control.

Because the UNHCR encourages and facilitates voluntary repatriation, at what point does the promotion stop? Every decision to close a camp and encourage the return of the refugees therein walks a fine line between promoting repatriation and *refoulement*. If gently inducing refugee populations to re-enter their home countries does not work, how, then, to encourage the re-entry of migrated populations? At what point does this become forced if the refugees are not ready to return home? The role of the UNHCR is to give the refugee an opportunity to voluntarily return home with the UNHCR’s assistance before he or she ceases to become a refugee. Returning refugees are obliged to sign a statement stating:

This information is intended to give you in broad outline, the gist of the agreement reached and the procedures to be followed to facilitate your return. THE DECISION IS YOURS AND YOURS ALONE and it should not be influenced by instructions you may have received by any one else.

The UNHCR has moved from facilitating migration to actively promoting it, supporting this policy shift with a number of legal safeguards. Refugees who refuse to return during an organized voluntary

55 Hammond, 120.
56 UNHCR, Note on Voluntary Repatriation, 27 August 1980. www.unhcr.org
57 Stein, 269
58 Zieck, 436
Repatriation would not be subjected to individual status re-determination until the conditions in their home country necessitate applying the cessation clause\textsuperscript{59}.

Furthermore, given the situation endured in their country of origin, refugees are often in danger of reprisals in their country of origin, particularly those who participated in violence themselves. The repatriation of former militants is a particularly difficult problem. While the OAU refugee convention has set up a specific provision granting that refugees ‘shall not be penalized’ for having left for any of the reasons giving rise to refugee situations,\textsuperscript{60} assuring their safety is more problematic. While this may be an inducement to re-enter their homeland, how easy is it to ensure that there will be no anxiety surrounding the repatriation of these refugees?

Given that the status of refugee is based on feelings of fear and anxiety, before repatriating refugees, the UNHCR has to formally establish the level of apprehension within the group with regard to returning home before promoting repatriation. For example, in the case of Mozambican refugees in Malawi, they had to measure whether there was a « pool of refugees who had a well founded fear of persecution should they return to Mozambique.\textsuperscript{61} » It remains to be seen, however, to what extent one can establish ‘fear of persecution’ quantitatively amongst refugee populations, and with what means. [cf. previous comment about the feelings of refugees usually being ignored and the decision being based on objective determinants: is there an elected government in place? Has the violence subsided? ]

**Timing of Repatriation**

What the above underscores is the extent to which timing is essential in repatriation. The cessation clause may be applied if the refugee « has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality» or if « the circumstances in which he was recognized as a refugee cease to exist\textsuperscript{62} »; the latter is known as the ‘ceased circumstances’ clause. Once the reasons for ‘fear of persecution’ cease to exist, refugee status may legitimately be terminated.\textsuperscript{63} However, certain examples

\textsuperscript{59} The application of the cessation clause means that refugees lose their refugee status. For more detail, see appendix 2

\textsuperscript{60} OAU Refugee Convention (Article V, paragraph 4)

\textsuperscript{61} Zieck, 415.


\textsuperscript{63} Ibid

*Repatriation, Resettlement, Integration: A study of the three refugee solutions* - The Niapele Project/Sciences Po
of repatriation put into question the point at which the cessation clause was applied. In the example of Buduburam, the UNHCR applied the cessation clause after the Ghanaian government repressed a sit-down protest by women and children in April 2008 violently. The timing for the application of cessation clauses was undoubtedly precipitated by the political tension between the camp and the Ghanaian government. Currently, there are no concrete guidelines as to when and how cessation clauses can be applied when the situation in the homeland is relatively peaceful.

However, most repatriation does not begin and end with the application of a cessation clause. In many refugee situations, the UNHCR will organize intermittent repatriations, and encourage earlier voluntary repatriations. However, repatriation policy is moving increasingly toward encouraging completed repatriation as an active part of the reconstruction process. In the case of Mozambican refugees returning from Malawi, repatriation was scheduled to be completed by April 1994, and demobilization completed by May 1994, so that both refugees and soldiers could register for and participate in the elections in October. At the time of the elections on October 27 and 28, 2004, demobilization had only recently taken place, former soldiers not yet re-employed. In the interest of pushing through to the elections, repatriation and demobilization took place almost concurrently; while this did not lead to unrest in the Mozambican example, it does raise questions about stability requirements for integration. Is refugee repatriation encouraged for the sake of stability goals, at the expense of their security and well-being? Freedom of choice is not often accorded to refugee groups, and their long-term happiness must be gauged after repatriation is completed.

**The True Test of Repatriation: Reintegration**

Repatriation is not a simple « mission accomplished » at the time at which the refugees re-enter their country of origin. The essential problem is that of determining to what extent NGOs, the UNHCR and various other organizations continue their participation after the refugees return home. In the case of Mozambique, the refugees returning in spring 1994 returned to a country coming back from the brink of disaster. The deadline for complete reintegration was set for exactly 2 years later, in June 1996, with lofty benchmarks for ‘completed’ reintegration, such as re-establishment of a functional agrarian economy. Can reintegration be measured by any such quantitative benchmark?

Legally speaking, the voluntary rendition of the refugee to their home country is enough to

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assume that the bonds between citizen and country are re-assumed. Technically speaking, the UNHCR defines reintegration as the process « that should result in the disappearance of differences in legal rights and duties between returnees and their compatriots and the equal access of returnees to services, productive assets and opportunities. » The UNHCR has outlined the steps of the reintegration process using the four R’s: Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction. The stages of repatriation are much more complicated, and the repatriation of refugees is a complex, socially transformative process for the refugees and society itself. Economically, a number of development projects, including QiPs (Quick Implementation Projects) to facilitate the sustainable reintegration of these persons, complements the reintegration of refugees. While life may never be completely the same for these refugees, the use of the 4 R’s, which complements and fits into a broader development strategic framework, is the best way to ensure long-term stability for the reintegrated refugees. For the refugees returning to Liberia in 2007 and 2008, the situation has been particularly difficult. While the economic situation is improving, Liberia is still reeling from the effects of the war, and employment generation has been is stunted. Even though thousands of jobs have been created, they are largely short-term, focusing on minor road works and infrastructure projects.

For the rehabilitation of former militants in Liberia, the situation is even more problematic. Unrecognized officially in refugee camps such as Buduburam, ex combatants, notably former child soldiers, received no targeted psychological support while in exile, and face unique obstacles concerning repatriation. The risk of reprisals is high, and finding a new livelihood, even more difficult. While the UNDP estimated in August 2007 that it had provided for 63,000 former combatants to find sustainable alternative livelihoods in Liberia, it closed its support in June 2008, and is now reliant on new private support. The Secretary General report on the situation in Liberia noted that this program has been largely inadequate, and a number of former militants have regrouped to illegally exploit the country’s diamond and rubber resources. The case of former combatants serves to highlight the problems facing repatriated refugees. They suffer the residual trauma combined with a concrete obstacle to reintegrating into the home country that is the source of their trauma.

66 Ibid, 25.
Yet, while voluntary repatriation is difficult, there is no easy answer to a protracted refugee situation, and voluntary repatriation has increasingly become the international norm for post-conflict refugee solutions. Taking this into account, the timing, and execution of repatriation seems to walk a fine line between following the needs and desires of refugees, and the needs of their country’s reconstruction. Refugees are more than a tool in the reconstruction of a country, and thus it is imperative to prioritize the well-being of these individuals when examining solutions to prolonged refugee situations.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While it is clear that repatriation has become the international norm for the ‘solution’ of prolonged forced migration situations, to what extent and at what cost is repatriation applied? It is crucial that the issues surrounding the methods and timing of repatriation be considered critically. There are currently no clear guidelines as to when the cessation clause can be applied: only that it may, ostensibly arbitrarily, be applied once the situation in the home country is stable. Given the upheaval involved in closing a refugee camp, we strongly suggest that there be safeguards involved to ensure that the cessation clause is not applied arbitrarily, but when the economic situation in the home country is truly stable and able to absorb the influx of population, and when the refugees themselves are ready. This comes beyond the objective assessment of the security situation in the home country, i.e. whether violence has subsided, if there is a democratically elected government that has established authority over all regions of the country, etc.

The essential problem is that the means used to decide the future of certain refugee camps lack the input of refugees on an institutional level. A tripartite commission of the UNHCR, the host country and home country, most often decides their fate. We would suggest that in order to ensure the sustainability and relevance of a solution to protracted refugee crises, genuinely representative refugee voices be included in the negotiations that go into this critical decision.

Furthermore, given the trauma endured in their home country, repatriation may simply not be a personally viable option for many refugees. Repatriation is not a panacea to every protracted refugee situation, and diversified solutions should be considered. Integration has been proven to achieve a certain degree of success in a number of countries, but generally lacks state-level support. Equally, in
certain situations, resettlement to a third country is not only desirable but also necessary. For former combatants, many will never feel safe in their home country, or in the region. Forcing “voluntary” repatriation on these individuals can potentially lead to destabilization in the home country, as the reintegration process will undoubtedly feel insufficient for these people. For fragile countries recovering from war and dealing with major reconstruction challenges, the inability to deal with these cases can create setbacks on the road to rebuilding their nation.

Thus, when looking at any of the ‘solutions’ to a refugee situation, the three do not exist in a vacuum, nor in opposition to each other. Used in unison, they simultaneously encourage integration to those individuals who have developed solid economic ties to their host country, to facilitate rehabilitation for former combatants, and repatriate those who are truly ready to return home. Given the diversity of protracted refugee situations, we encourage relevant institutions to adopt a more flexible decision-making process, one that actively incorporates the voices of the refugees themselves. The human rights of the refugees must be upheld when choosing a solution.
Appendix I

MAIN COUNTRIES OF RESETTLEMENT in 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>52,868</td>
<td>62.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>15,967</td>
<td>18.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>10,521</td>
<td>12.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1,801</td>
<td>2.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>0.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New-Zealand</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>0.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>0.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>84,640</td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


REFUGEES ADMITTED FOR RESETTLEMENT IN 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>41,300</td>
<td>57.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>13,400</td>
<td>18.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>10,700</td>
<td>14.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>3.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New-Zealand</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>0.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>3.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>71,700</td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It’s important to notice that in spite of the resumption of resettlement cases in 2004, this trend subsided. In 2005, resettlement declined by 5% (only 80,800 refugees were resettled in 16 countries), and continued to fall in 2006 by 11%, to reach 71,700 resettled in 14 host countries. The 14 host countries in 2006 admitted refugees of more than 100 nationalities – the main beneficiary groups hailed from Somalia (11,100), Sudan (6,400), Russia (6,200) and Myanmar (6,000). Latin American countries also began to welcome candidates for resettlement, most notably from Colombia.
Article 1 of the 1951 Convention – When is a refugee no longer a refugee?

**Article 1. Definition of the term "refugee"**

A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee, shall apply to any person who:

(1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization;

Decisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee Organization during the period of its activities shall not prevent the status of refugee being accorded to persons who fulfill the conditions of paragraph 2 of this section;

(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term "the country of his nationality" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national.

B. (1) For the purposes of this Convention, the words "events occurring before 1 January 1951" in article 1, section A, shall be understood to mean either (a) "events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951"; or (b) "events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951"; and each Contracting State shall make a declaration at the time of signature, ratification or accession, specifying which of these meanings it applies for the purpose of its obligations under this Convention.

(2) Any Contracting State which has adopted alternative (a) may at any time extend its obligations by adopting alternative (b) by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

C. This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of section A if:

(1) He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; or

(2) Having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily reacquired it; or

(3) He has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality; or

(4) He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution; or
(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality;

Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A (I) of this article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country of nationality;

(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, able to return to the country of his former habitual residence;

Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A (I) of this article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to return to the country of his former habitual residence.

D. This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.

When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this Convention.

E. This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country.

F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that.

(a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;

(b) He has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;

(c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.